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Banking Integration in the European
Economic Community: Impact on the
Eurodollar Market
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment discusses the European Economic Community's
(EEC)Q ' Second Banking Directive, 2 which is designed to integrate
banking activities within the EEC by the end of 1992, and the impact
bank integration will have on the Eurodollar market.' The banking
systems of EEC Member States are being integrated in order to
encourage competition. Increased competition is expected to cause a
reduction in the costs of financial services provided within the EEC.
4
The Member States believe that bank integration is an essential
1. Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar.
25, 1957, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The aim of the EEC is to
"promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities." Id.
at art. 2. The Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, stated that the goal of the European
Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] was "the abolition, as between Member States, of
the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services, and capital." Id. at art. 3(c). The
EEC currently consists of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the Neth-
erlands. Whitehead, Moving toward 1992: A Common Financial Market for Europe?, FED.
RESERvE BANK OF ATLANTA, ECON. REv. 42, 43 (Nov.-Dec. 1988) [hereinafter Whitehead].
2. Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 84) 1 (1988)
[hereinafter Second Directive].
3. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text (defining Eurodollar and the Eurodollar
market).
4. See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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element in creating a single market throughout the community for
goods, services, and labor. Creating a single market will enhance the
economic performance of Member States, which has lagged behind
that of the United States and Japan in recent years.' Banking
integration has proven to be a difficult process because the structures
and traditions of banking systems within Member States are diverse.
6
The Second Directive allows EEC based banks greater access than is
currently permitted to the banking markets of other Member States.
The Annex7 to the Second Directive lists activities that may be carried
out by EEC based banks operating in other Member States under
the new integrated banking systemA
The Second Directive's approach to banking integration as well as
the directive's impact on non EEC based banks are the topics under
discussion in the second section of this Comment. The third section
describes the international banking transactions that create Eurodol-
lars. The fourth section provides an historical overview of the de-
velopment of the Eurodollar market, compares the approaches to
bank regulation taken by Great Britain and West Germany, and
predicts how the Second Directive should change banking laws in
both of these countries. The fifth section analyzes the impact banking
integration will have on the Eurodollar market by examining the
effects on depositors, borrowers, and banks.
5. A comparison of several key economic indicators shows that the EEC has a higher
rate of unemployment and a lower per capita GNP than either the United States or Japan.
The EEC is exporting more goods to the United States than the United States is exporting to
the EEC. However, the Japanese are exporting more goods to the EEC than the EEC is
exporting to Japan.
All figures are for 1988 and in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
U.S. EEC Japan
Per capita GNP (87) $18,530 $12,732 $15,760
Unemployment rate 5.5% 10.25% 2.5%
U.S. exports (billions) $75.9 $37
EEC exports (billions) $84.9 $24
Japan exports (billions) $89.8 $47
See World Development Report 1989, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 12, 1988; Background Notes (Japan),
DBP'T ST. BuLL.; U.S. Comm. DEP'T; BANK OF TOKYO; all reprinted in The U.S., Europe and
Japan: The Global Economy in Transition?, FoR. POL'Y A., GREAT DEcISioNs 1990, at 17
(1990). See also Moreno & Ferry, 1992: A United and Prosperous Europe?, FED. RESERvE
BANK OF SAN FRAicisco, WEEKiY LETrER (Aug. 12, 1988) (discussing EEC economic per-
formance).
6. See infra notes 193-254 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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II. BANKING INTEGRATION UNDER THE SECOND DIREcTvE
A. The Objectives of Banking Integration
In 1985, the EEC adopted the Single European Act (SEA) 9 as an
international agreement among the Member States of the EEC.10 The
SEA embodies the desire of EEC Member States to make "concrete
progress towards unity."" Member States recognize the need for
open and efficient financial markets in an increasingly competitive
global financial market. 12 The Second Directive, effective January 1,
1993,13 states that there is an intimate link between banking liberal-
ization and the free movement of capital and that banking activities
should be coordinated with other directives liberalizing the capital
markets.' 4 By allowing EEC based banks to provide financial services
throughout the Community, the Second Directive should promote
growth and efficiency in the banking industry making EEC banks
stronger competitors within the EEC as well as in the world market.1
5
Currently, the banking laws and regulatory systems estab-
lished in each EEC Member State reflect such factors as geo-
graphic location, expertise of banking professionals, and the
relationships between the central banks16 and their respective bank-
9. Single European Act of Feb. 17, 1986, 30 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987)
[hereinafter SEA].
10. See Whitehead, supra note 1, at 45 (Member States ratified SEA during 1986 and
1987). See also Campbell, The Single European Act and the Implications, 35 INT'L & Comp.
L.Q. 932 (1986) (discussing SEA implications for Great Britain).
11. SEA, supra note 9, at art. 4; see also Whitehead, supra note 1, at 45. "[T]he Single
European Act marked a shift in the European Community's philosophy from the originally
desired 'harmonization and centralization' to the new goals of 'minimal harmonization' and
'mutual recognition.' " Id.
12. Zavvos, Towards A European Banking Act, 25 CoMMoN MKT. L. REv. 263, 264-65
[hereinafter Zavvos, Banking Act]. Mr. Zavvos is a member of the Directorate for Financial
Institutions, D.G. XV, Commission of the European Communities in Brussels. He was involved
in the drafting and presentation of a proposal for a Second Banking Coordination Directive.
Zavvos, Banking Integration in the European Community, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 572
(1989) [hereinafter Zavvos, Banking Integration].
13. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 22, 1.
14. Id. at sixteenth whereas cl. See also Zavvos, Banking Act, supra note 12, at 264
(freedom to provide financial services promotes liberalization of capital movements).
15. Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European Economic
Community and its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAm INT'L L.J. 205, 207 (1989)
[hereinafter Gruson & Nikowitz].
16. A country's central bank is:
The institution charged primarily with controlling a country's money and banking
system, though with other functions depending on the financial structure and
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ing systems.' 7 Reflecting the individual differences in each Member
State's banking traditions and regulations, the relationships between
bank supervisors and central banks among the Member States are
often inconsistent. 8 The laws and regulations adopted by each EEC
Member State for supervising foreign branches and foreign bank
subsidiaries are often inconsistent as well. 19 Each country's supervi-
sory system emphasizes regulation of different aspects of the inter-
national lending process. 20 The First Banking Directive2' attempted
to centralize the supervision of EEC banking activities. 22 However,
Member States realized that implementing comprehensive uniform
regulations throughout the EEC was impractical. Furthermore, due
to the different regulatory policies of the Member States, uniformity
was deemed impossible to achieve within a reasonable time period.23
Unlike the First Directive, the Second Directive adopts an approach
of mutual recognition2" whereby EEC Member States honor the
environment [of the country] .... The powers and precise functions of central banks
vary widely, the most essential being those connected with the operation of MON-
ETARY POLICY, though these powers themselves are subject to any external
constraints on the country's ability to pursue independent policies.
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN EcoNoMICS 59 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter EcoNoMIcS
DICTIONARY].
17. Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending, (pts. I & 2), 12
INT'L L. REv. 153, 202 (1986) [hereinafter Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 1) & (pt. 2)].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 202-03; see infra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
21. First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Related to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 322) 30 (1987) [hereinafter First Directive].
22. Whitehead, supra note 1, at 45. The author states that the:
"Host country rule" characterized the First Banking Directive, which was adopted
in 1977 and established a basic set of rules under which financial institutions could
establish branches across national boundaries .... In order to establish a branch,
authorization by the appropriate supervisor in the host country must by acquired....
The Second Directive shifts the emphasis from host country rule to home country
rule and applies a principle which involves the mutual recognition by all member
states of the authorization and supervisory systems within each member state.
Id. at 45-46.
23. Key, Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the European Com-
munity, 75 FED. REsERvE Buu ., 591, 601-02 (1989) [hereinafter Key, Integration of the
Financial Sector]. The SEA marks a change in strategy for implementing standardized regulatory
requirements within the EEC. Instead of requiring complete "harmonization and centralization"
of regulatory and supervisory operations, the new approach seeks to achieve "minimal
harmonization" and "mutual recognition." This new approach seeks to secure minimum
standards in order to safeguard public safety while promoting competition. The result is that
products and services approved and regulated in one Member State can be offered to other
Member States throughout the EEC. Whitehead, supra note 1, at 45.
24. Some commentators assert that the Second Directive creates a single banking license
for banks to operate throughout the EEC. See Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12,
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banking laws, regulations and administrative or supervisory practices
of other Member States.Y The Annex to the Second Directive2 6 lists
those activities which credit institutions27 may provide throughout the
Community.2 Essentially, the Second Directive is a passport for EEC
based banks to operate in other Member States subject to the
supervision of the bank's home country.29
at 574. However, it is more accurate to state that the Second Directive requires mutual
recognition by Member States of banking licenses issued in other Member States. Each Member
State will continue to issue separate banking licenses. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15,
at 213, stating:
Thus, the Second Directive does not create a European "federal" banking license;
it decrees that each Member State's banking license shall be valid throughout the
EEC.... The principle of mutual recognition gives credit institutions licensed in
one Member State access to all Member States. This EEC-wide access creates an
inter-Member State banking market, which differs from the single-state U.S. banking
market.
Id.
25. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 1; see also Key, Integration of the Financial
Sector, supra note 23, at 602 (mutual recognition prevents national laws from restricting bank
access to Member States).
26. The Annex to the Second Directive lists "(b)usiness which is integral to banking and
shall be included within the scope of mutual recognition." Second Directive, supra note 2, at
annex. Those activities are:
1) Deposit-taking and other forms of borrowing
2) Lending ((i)ncluding in particular: consumer credit, mortgage lending, factoring
and invoice discounting, trade finance (including forfeiting))
3) Financial leasing
4) Money transmission services
5) Issuing and administering means of payment (credit cards, travellers cheques and
bankers drafts)
6) Guarantees and commitments
7) Trading for own account or for account of the customers in:
a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.)
b) foreign exchange
c) financial futures and options
d) exchange and interest rate instruments
e) securities
8) Participation in securities issues and the provision of services related to such
issues
9) Money broking
10) Portfolio management and advice
11) Safekeeping of securities
12) Safe custody services.
Id.
27. A "credit institution" is defined as an "undertaking whose business is to receive
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account."
First Directive, supra note 21, at art 1. The use of the word "bank" is synonymous with the
term "credit institution." While the Second Directive uses the latter term, this Comment will
use the word "bank" throughout.
28. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 211; Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra
note 12, at 574.
29. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 574. "All the activities of banks and
other financial institutions carried out through branching or on a cross-frontier provision of
services throughout the Community's territory, in principle, will be supervised by the competent
authorities of the Member State of the institution's head office." Id.
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The Second Directive does not create a uniform system of banking
law throughout the EEC.30 Rather, the Second Directive creates a
few essential regulatory and supervisory standards which will be
uniform throughout the EEC.31 Harmonization of additional banking
regulations and supervisory standards is an ongoing process and
Member States disagree on the extent of supervision mandated in the
Second Directive.32 In those areas where there is no agreement, each
Member State will continue to regulate its respective banking system
in the manner it deems most prudent. 33 The Second Directive attempts
to improve the efficiency of EEC banking through increased com-
petition, with individual Member States continuing to supervise banks
in areas not covered by the directive. 4 This approach preserves
stability and confidence in the banking systems of the Member
States. 35
B. Mutual Recognition of Banking Licenses and the List of
Banking Activities Under the Second Directive
The Second Directive no longer requires a bank seeking to open a
branch36 in another Member State to obtain host Member State37
authorization. 38 Instead, a bank wishing to establish a branch in
30. Id.
31. Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 211.
32. According to one commentator:
Mutual recognition cannot simply be decreed among a group of countries with
widely divergent legal systems, statutory provisions, and regulatory and supervisory
practices. Mutual recognition of rules that differ as to what a country regards as
essential elements and characteristics would be politically unacceptable. As a result,
a crucial prerequisite for mutual recognition is the harmonization of essential rules.
If member states consider certain rules essential but cannot reach agreement on
initial harmonization, they may agree explicitly to exclude such rules from mutual
recognition and home-country control until agreement can by reached.
Key, Integration of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 602.
33. Id.
34. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 573.
35. Id.
36. A "branch" is defined as a:
place of business which forms a legally dependent part of a credit institution and
which conducts directly all or some of the operations inherent in the business of
credit institutions; any number of branches set up in the same Member State by a
credit institution having its head office in another Member State shall be regarded
as a single branch,
First Directive, supra note 21, at art. 1.
37. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 3. "Host Member State" is defined as the
"Member State where a credit institution has a branch or into which it supplies services." Id.
at art. 1.
38. Id. at art. 5, 1. "Authorization" is defined as any "instrument issued in any form
by the authorities by which the right to carry on the business of a credit institution is granted."
First Directive, supra note 21, at art. 1.
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another Member State shall give notification to the competent
authority 9 of the bank's home Member State.40 Home Member State
authorization allows a bank to provide services on an EEC-wide
basis if these services are permitted by the home Member State in
the bank's license and listed in the Annex to the Second Directive.
41
Therefore, a bank may conduct activities permitted by both the home
Member State and the Annex in the host Member State even if the
host Member State prohibits domestic banks from conducting that
particular activity.
42
All banks wishing to establish a branch in another Member State
must provide certain information to the home Member State.43 This
information includes the name of the Member State where the bank
intends to establish a branch,44 a list of the types of business
contemplated, and the structural organization of the business. 4 Banks
that are opening a branch in another Member State for the first time
must additionally notify the home Member State of the activities
listed in the Annex which it intends to undertake in the host Member
State.46
Before establishing a branch, banks must also provide financial
information about the amount of own funds
47 and the solvency ratio48
to the home Member State.49 Banks must provide the business address
in the host Member State where documents can be obtained and the
39. "Competent authority" is defined as the "national authorities which are empowered
by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions." Council Directive of 13 June 1983 on
the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, art. 1, 26 O.J. EUR. CoMM.
(No. L 193) 18 (1983) [hereinafter Supervision of Credit Institutions].
40. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 17, 1. "Home Member State" is defined as
the "Member State where a credit institution is authorized ... ." Id. at art. 1.
41. Id. at art. 16; see also Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 213-14 (home Member
State license only valid for activities enumerated in Annex); Zavvos, Banking Integration,
supra note 12, at 575-76 (banks must be authorized by home Member State and conduct
activities in Annex to operate throughout EEC).
42. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 576.
43. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 17, 2.
44. Id. at 2(a).
45. Id. at 2(b).
46. Id. at art. 18, 1.
47. "Own funds" is defined as the "credit institution's own capital, including items which
may be treated as capital under national rules." First Directive, supra note 21, at art. 1.
48. See Proposal for a Council Directive on Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions, 31
O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 135) 4 (1988). Solvency ratios weigh assets and off-balance sheet
transactions (those transactions that do not have to be reported in financial statements presented
to regulatory agencies) according to the degree of credit risk. Solvency ratios play a central
role in the prudential supervision of credit institutions and are directly complementary to the
goals of the Second Directive. Id. at art. 4.
49. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 17, 1 2(c).
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names of those responsible for controlling the activities of the branch 0
The home Member State will relay the above information to the
competent authority of the host Member State within three months
after receiving the information, unless the home Member State has
reason to doubt the adequacy of the organizational structure of the
bank.5 1 When the home Member State refuses to relay the above
information to the host Member State, the home Member State is
required to give reasons for its refusal to the bank seeking to open
a branch in another Member State.5 2 This refusal may be appealed
in the courts of the home Member State.
5 3
The Second Directive does not mandate that Member States allow
their domestic banks to perform the activities specified in the Annex.1
4
However, failure by one Member State to allow its domestic banks
to conduct banking activities which that Member State must permit
other EEC based banks to conduct results in reverse discrimination
against domestic banks. 5- Banks based in those Member States which
allow the banking activities contained in the Annex will have a
competitive advantage over those Member States with more restrictive
banking practices.5 6 EEC Member States will compete to adopt the
most favorable banking measures, commonly referred to as "the race
for the bottom. ' 57 The force of competition should drive Member
States with more restrictive banking regulations to adopt the less
restrictive measures in the Second Directive. 58 In time, all Member
States will most likely issue banking licenses allowing those activities
set forth in the Annex in order to eliminate the initial competitive
advantage enjoyed by banks from Member States which currently
permit those activities. The Annex, in combination with the race for
50. Id. at 2(d), (e).
51. Id. at 3. "Unless the competent authority of the home Member State has reason
to doubt the adequacy of the organizational structure of the credit institution, taking into
account the envisaged operations, it shall . . . communicate the information ... to the
competent authority of the host Member State." Id. This language is ambiguous because it
does not state the criteria that a home Member State should use in determining whether there
is reason to doubt the adequacy of the organizational structure of a credit institution.
52. Id. The home Member State must notify the credit institution within three months of
its refusal to forward the information to the host Member State. Id.
53. Id.
54. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 576.
55. Id.
56. Bennett & Hakkio, Europe 1992: Implications for U.S. Firms, FED. RESERVE BANK
oF KANsAs Crry, EcoN. Ray. 3, 10 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter Bennett & Hakkio].
57. Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 217.
58. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 576; Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note
15, at 216-17.
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the bottom, will promote the harmonization of banking activities
throughout the Community.
C. Bank Supervision
The EEC intends to standardize selected bank regulations through-
out the Community in order to facilitate banking integration.5 9 The
home Member State is responsible for supervision of the activities
of a bank operating in other Member States. 6° Authorization for a
bank to operate in a host Member State will not be granted by the
home Member State if the bank's initial capital is less than five
million European Currency Units. 61 The competent authorities of the
home Member State must monitor each bank to assure that the
bank's own funds do not fall below the initial capital required upon
authorization.
62
The home Member State must also supervise owners of banks
operating in other Member States to assure that the banks are soundly
managed. 63 Home Member States must be informed of any physical
or legal person who is considering a direct or indirect acquisition of
59. Second Directive, supra note 2, at second whereas cl. See also Gruson & Nikowitz,
supra note 15, at 223 (EEC harmonization of essential supervisory standards); Bennett &
Hakkio, supra note 56, at 9-10 (discussing Member States' supervisory functions). There will
be three areas that will continue to be under the supervision of the host country. Banks will
be subject to host Member State regulations for monetary policy purposes, for example, reserve
requirements on various assets, supervision of securities activities, and primary responsibility
to assure the liquidity of the bank. The purpose of providing certain minimum standards is
to assure that bank regulations remain prudent and to maintain confidence in the banking
market. Id.
60. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 19, 1. Host Member States may require, for
statistical purposes, that all credit institutions having branches in their territories shall report
quarterly on their operations in the host Member State to the competent authority of that
host Member State. Id. at 2.
Host Member States shall retain primary responsibility for the supervision of the liquidity
of credit institutions until further coordination, and may require that branches of credit
institutions operating in the host Member State provide the same information as domestic
credit institutions. See id. at arts. 2, 2, 19, 2.
61. Id. at art. 3, 1. "Member States may propose that initial capital be fixed at an
amount lower than that provided for in paragraph 1 in the case of institutions whose scope
of authorized business is restricted by law or statute." Id. at 2. The European Currency
Unit [hereinafter ECU] is a composite currency that consists of fixed amounts of 10 European
currencies. The quantity of each country's currency in the ECU reflects that country's relative
economic strength in the EEC. A. SiApmo, MULTINATIONAL F'NANCLAL MANAGEMENT 63 (3d
ed. 1989) [hereinafter SHApmo].
62. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 8, 1, 4.
63. Id. at art. 9, 3. However, the Second Directive fails to define what constitutes
sound management practices. Therefore, different Member States might disagree concerning
the review of a credit institution's management practices.
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a qualified participation 64 and shall determine the suitability of that
party.65 Banks must send to the competent authorities annual listings
of individuals holding a qualified participation." Member States shall
take appropriate steps to end a situation in which qualified partici-
pants exert influence on a bank in a manner detrimental to the sound
management of the bank's activities. 67 To prevent conflicts of interest,
the Second Directive places a ten percent limit on a bank's investment
of its own funds in an undertaking which is not a bank or financial
institution.6 8 The competent authorities of the home Member State
must also ensure that each bank operates with "sound" administra-
tive and accounting procedures as well as with "adequate" internal
controls.
6 9
The harmonization of essential supervisory standards is consistent
with the concept of mutual recognition and home Member State
control. Costs incurred by complying with regulatory and supervisory
requirements demand that banks increase the spread between the
interest rates charged to borrowers and the interest paid to deposi-
tors.70 Banks from Member States with less rigorous supervision will
64. Id. at art. I. Qualified participation means a holding, direct or indirect, in an
undertaking which represents 10% or more of the capital or of the voting rights or which
enables the exercise of a significant influence. Id. Those with qualified participation must
similarly inform the competent authorities if they propose to increase their qualified partici-
pation such that the credit institution would become a subsidiary. Id. at art. 9, 1.
65. Id. at art. 9, 2. The Second Directive fails to elaborate on the criteria the competent
authorities might use in passing on the suitability of those seeking a qualified participation.
66. Id. The list includes the names of major shareholders and the size of their qualified
participation, in accordance with the names registered at the annual shareholders meeting, or
compiled as a result of complying with the requirements of a stock exchange. Id.
67. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 9, 3.
68. Id. at art. 10, 1. The credit institution might make unnecessary or improper loans
to a company in which it has a large ownership interest. Therefore, this limitation is intended
to prevent conflicts of interest. Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 224.
A "financial institution" is defined as ". . . an undertaking, not being a credit institution,
whose principal activity is to grant credit facilities (including guarantees), to acquire partici-
pation or to make investments." Supervision of Credit Institutions, supra note 39, at art. 1.
Credit institutions may own up to 50% of a financial institution. Id. at art. 4, 1.
The Second Directive also states that a credit institution can maintain a qualified participation
of greater than 10% if the undertaking falls within "Article 43(2)(f) of Directive 86/635/
EEC." Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 10. Article 43(2)(f) states that:
Where a parent undertaking is a credit institution and where one or more subsidiary
undertakings to be consolidated do not have that status, those subsidiary undertakings
shall be included in the consolidation if their activities are a direct extension of
banking or concern services ancillary to banking, such as leasing, factoring, the
management of unit trusts, the management of data processing services or any other
similar activity.
Council Directive of 8 December 1986 on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts
of Banks and other Financial Institutions, 29 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 372) 1 (1086).
69. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 11, I.
70. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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have a competitive advantage over banks from Member States with
stringent regulation and supervision. 71 Over time, political pressure
from banks operating at a competitive disadvantage should force
Member States to eliminate regulatory disparities. 72 Once the excess
costs due to complying with regulatory requirements are removed,
banks will be able to compete more efficiently in the marketplace.
Home Member State supervision of banks will result in indirect
cost savings throughout the EEC.73 Presently, a bank must comply
with the regulations imposed by each of the Member States in which
it operates. After the Second Directive goes into effect, a bank will
have to meet only one set of regulations. 74 The elimination of
overlapping and contradictory regulations will reduce the cost struc-
ture of banks in the European banking system.
75
D. Impact of the Second Directive on Non-EEC Banks
The benefits of the Second Directive also will be extended to Non-
EEC banks.76 Under the Second Directive, subsidiaries77 of non EEC
71. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 10.
72. Id. See also Key, Integration of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 604, stating:
(T)he Community assumes that over the longer run market forces will create pressure
on governments that will lead to a convergence of additional national rules and
practices that have not been harmonized at the EC level. Pressures for regulatory
convergence within the Community would arise both from the absence of restrictions
on capital movements and from the regulatory advantages enjoyed by branches of
banks and investment firms from other member states and also by head offices of
such banks and investment firms in providing services across borders.
Id.
73. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Creation of a European Financial Area, 36 Etm. EcoN. 35 (1938) (benefits for
non-EEC banks are same as for EEC banks). The article notes that:
The Community's integrated financial market will be characterized:
i) by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within the
Community;
ii) by coordinated rules relating to the access to or exercise of the profession of
financial intermediaries, which are intended to ensure that all users of financial
services enjoy the same protection;
iii) by coordinated systems of surveillance and control, designed to ensure the
stability of the financial system.
Id.
77. Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 Based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty
on Consolidated Accounts, art. l(a)-(d), 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 193) 1 (1983). A firm
establishes a subsidiary if it controls another firm in the following areas:
a) has a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in another
undertaking; or
b) has the right to appoint or remove the majority of administrative, management
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banks already established in a Member State will be able to operate
on an EEC-wide basis in the same manner as EEC banks. 78 Existing
subsidiaries of non EEC banks will be treated as any other bank in
the Member State in which they are incorporated. 79 In contrast,
branches of non EEC banks will not receive the benefits of mutual
recognition of their banking licenses and therefore will be unable to
operate on an EEC-wide basis.80 Branches of non-EEC banks will
continue to be authorized and regulated separately by each EEC
Member State, since branches generally do not have to meet all of
the regulatory requirements of subsidiaries."'
Requests from banks governed by the laws of a non EEC country
for authorization to establish a subsidiary or to acquire a participation
in an existing EEC bank will be subject to reciprocity. 2 Reciprocity
may be applied in one of two ways: "national" treatment or "mirror-
image" treatment. 3 National treatment occurs when regulations apply
to both domestic and foreign banks in a nondiscriminatory manner,
allowing all banks to compete on an equal basis. 4 Mirror-image
reciprocity means that each non EEC bank will be allowed to provide
only those services which EEC banks are allowed to provide in that
and supervisory personnel, while being a shareholder; or
c) has the right to exercise dominant influence over another firm of which it is a
shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract; or
d) is a shareholder or member of a firm; and
(aa) a majority of the administrative, management, or supervisory bodies of the
subsidiary in any accounting period have been appointed solely as a result of the
exercise of its voting rights; or
(bb) controls alone, or through a shareholders agreement, a majority of share-
holders' or members' voting rights.
Id. (paraphrasing).
78. Second Directive, supra note 2, at arts. 5, 1, 16, 1; see also Gruson & Nikowitz,
supra note 15, at 228 (discussing impact of reciprocity on non-EEC based banks). A subsidiary
established in one EEC Member State by a non-EEC based bank can then open offices, or
branches of the subsidiary, on an EEC-wide scale. Non-EEC banks which establish only a
branch in an EEC Member State do not benefit from mutual recognition of banking licenses,
and cannot open additional branches throughout the EEC. Id.
79. Key, Integration of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 600.
80. See Second Directive, supra note 2, at seventeenth whereas cl. (procedures established
in First Directive remain in force as to branches of credit institutions authorized in third
countries). See also Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 15, at 228 (branches cannot provide
services throughout EEC); Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 581-82 (branches
not autonomous legal entities, but extension of parent corporation).
81. Key, Integration of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 600.
82. Second Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7, 1, 6.
83. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 16.
84. Id. "As a matter of policy, the United States accords national treatment to foreign
banks." Id.
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non EEC bank's country. 5 Unless the non EEC country allows those
services included in the Second Directive, non EEC banks will be at
a competitive disadvantage compared with EEC banks.16 The Euro-
pean Commission has stated that it does not intend to apply mirror-
image reciprocity.8 7 However, no general definition of reciprocity in
domestic laws or international agreements 8 presently exists; how
reciprocity will be practiced after January 1, 1993, remains to be
seen.
A non EEC bank will be prohibited from establishing or acquiring
a subsidiary in any EEC country unless reciprocity is practiced by
the bank's country towards EEC Member States.8 9 However, the
scope of the reciprocity requirement is not specified in the Second
Directive; consequently, the ultimate impact on non EEC countries
and firms is uncertain. 90 The application of reciprocity has important
consequences for non EEC banks attempting to establish a subsidiary
in the EEC after January 1, 1993. Banks seeking to enter the EEC
for the first time would not benefit from any of the advantages of
mutual recognition and EEC-wide operations.
The Second Directive has the potential of increasing international
competition and growth. Some financial analysts anticipate the emer-
gence of a new generation of "Euroinvestor" free to invest currency,
including dollars, anywhere within the EEC.9' However, the reci-
85. Id. For example, since the United States does not allow credit institutions (domestic
or foreign) to underwrite securities, the EEC will not allow U.S. credit institutions to underwrite
securities in Europe even though it is allowed for EEC credit institutions. Id.
86. Id. "National treatment would strengthen U.S. banks; but mirror-image treatment
would severely limit the powers of U.S. banks operating in the EC." Id. For example, because
the United States prevents EEC banks (and U.S. banks) from branching throughout the United
States and from operating in the securities markets, a mirror-image application of the reciprocity
requirement would prevent U.S. banks from operating throughout the EEC and from under-
writing securities. However, under national treatment, all powers granted to U.S. banks are
granted to foreign banks in the United States. Therefore, U.S. and non-U.S. banks operate
on a non-discriminatory basis. The Second Directive would then grant U.S. banks the same
powers as those granted to EEC banks. Id.
87. Zavvos, Banking Integration, supra note 12, at 585.
88. Id. at 584.
89. Key, Integration of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 599. "Direct branches of
non-EC financial institutions would not be subject to EC reciprocity requirements." Id. at
600.
90. Orr, Reciprocity and Regulation of Entry, 2 U. IL. L. REv. 333, 338 (1988). However,
EEC Member States disagree about reciprocity. The more developed financial markets such as
Great Britain, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are skeptical about the
effectiveness of reciprocity requirements, while France wants to strengthen and extend reci-
procity requirements. The Bottom Line, BanER, Apr. 1989, at 80. See also Key, Integration
of the Financial Sector, supra note 23, at 600 (reciprocity provisions of Second Directive
expected to serve as model for reciprocity provisions in other directives).
91. Crabbe, EC Law Shapes the Pattern of European Banking, EURoMoNEY, June 1989,
at 61 [hereinafter Crabbe].
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procity requirement has the potential to create barriers to growth
and international trade. One thing is clear, an integrated EEC banking
system will dictate a reappraisal of the way 10,000 banks do business
within the EEC.92
1. A Comparison of the Impact of the Second Directive on
American and Japanese Banks
Non EEC banks seeking the benefits of operating in Europe must
establish or purchase a fully incorporated subsidiary with its own
capital in at least one Member State before January 1, 1993, or be
subject to reciprocity. 93 Non EEC banks must decide whether to
establish a subsidiary thereby gaining the benefits of mutual recog-
nition of banking licenses or whether they can afford being locked
out of the most lucrative financial market in the world. 94 The
decisions non EEC banks will make depend upon the particular
circumstances confronting those banks. For example, the decisions
facing American and Japanese banks are different because of the
way they operate in the EEC.
For most American banks, the recent trend has been to retrench
from retail and commercial banking in Europe. 95 American banks
still present in Europe generally run their European operations as
branches of their head offices in the United States. 96 Few American
banks operate subsidiaries in Europe; therefore, their legal structures
are not compatible with the Second Directive. 97 If most American
banks choose to remain active in Europe, they will be at a competitive
disadvantage unless they establish subsidiaries before the Second
Directive takes effect.
In contrast to the legal structure of American banks operating in
the EEC, Japanese banks in the EEC operate a subsidiary in at least
one European financial center. 98 Though they are not subject to the
92. Id.
93. Id at 63.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 64. Except for Citicorp, which is committed to remaining in the European
market, U.S. banks have withdrawn from Europe in order to focus on the U.S. market; others
have sold subsidiaries to raise capital in order to offset losses sustained on international and
domestic loans. For example, Bank of America has sold its Italian bank subsidiary to Deutsche
Bank. Chase Manhattan has sold its 18-branch Belgian bank network to Credit Lyonnais,
stating that it was going to concentrate on corporate finance activities in the EEC. Id.
96. Crabbe, supra note 91, at 64. "Although separately capitalised to meet local banking
regulations, few of them [U.S. banks] have banking licenses in the EC." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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reciprocity requirement, Japanese banks are not looking to expand
into new European markets at present.99 Japanese banks have never
operated an extensive retail banking business with many offices
located in each EEC country. 100 Instead, they have geared their bank
operations towards meeting the needs of sophisticated corporate
clients, whose banking needs can be served from their existing offices
located in EEC financial centers. In short, Japanese banks are less
concerned about the impact of the Second Directive.' 0'
The issue of reciprocity is not applicable to a European bank. 0 2
However, the decision concerning whether to expand throughout the
EEC or concentrate on the more familiar domestic market is as
difficult for European banks as for non EEC banks. 03 Additionally,
EEC based banks will have to contend with increasing competition
from other EEC banks entering their domestic market.
The mutual recognition of banking licenses will enable subsidiaries
of banks operating in Europe, including non EEC banks, to realize
cost reductions. 104 The services allowed under the Annex to the Second
Directive will most likely expand the powers of subsidiaries of non
EEC banks operating in Europe. 0 5 The Second Directive provides
banks with an incentive to expand their operations so long as price
differentials exist between Member States? °6 Banks choosing to ex-
pand will centralize lending operations reaping administrative cost
savings.'0 The banking systems of Member States will operate more
efficiently as bank expansion produces common distribution net-
works, managers, and support staffs. 08
2. Potential for Creation of Regional Trading Blocs
Regional trading blocs are by no means new to the international
arena. °9 However, since the end of the Second World War, regional
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Crabbe, supra note 91, at 64. Servicing corporate clients who have direct access to
the financial markets only requires that Japanese banks operate in the financial centers of the
EEC such as London, Brussels, or Frankfurt. Id.
102. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (European banks licensed by a Member
State will receive mutual recognition from all Member States).
103. Crabbe, supra note 91, at 64.
104. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 12.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Crabbe, supra note 91, at 64 (discussing methods of cost savings for
banks).
108. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 12. See also Crabbe, supra note 91, at 64
(discussing methods of cost savings for banks).
109. Cheng, Toward Trade Blocs?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FANcisco, WEEKLY
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economic integration and reduction of trade barriers on a global
basis have contributed to the expansion of international trade."0 The
EEC movement towards banking integration has raised concerns
about the potential for creating protective trading blocs, which would
create barriers against non bloc states, thereby retarding international
trade."' The Second Directive's reciprocity requirement, if applied in
a manner which protects EEC banks from competition by non EEC
banks, could inhibit growth in international trade instead of encour-
aging competition.1
2
If reciprocity is applied in a "mirror image"' 3 fashion, or in
another manner which sharply restricts access to EEC markets,
inefficient domestic industries will be protected and the citizens of
the EEC Member States will be deprived of the benefits envisioned
when the Single European Act was adopted.11 4 If protectionist barriers
are raised by the EEC, non EEC banks are affected in two ways.
First, non EEC banks may find it impossible to compete because of
the additional cost of doing business. Secondly, barriers in the EEC
would invite retaliatory barriers from other countries or trading blocs,
segmenting the world financial markets and raising the cost of credit
globally.
III. INTERNATIONAL BANKING CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE CREATION
OF EURODOLLARS
A. International Banking Classifications
Banking activities can be classified according to the residency of
both borrowers and depositors in relation to the bank and the
LErTER I (Aug. 5, 1988) [hereinafter Cheng]. Several trade blocs are in existence: the Committee
on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) consisting of eastern European nations; the
European Free Trade Association for northern European nations; the Lome Convention through
which the EEC provides special treatment to imports from African, Caribbean, and Pacific
nations; the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Andean Group for South American
countries; the Central American Common Market; the Caribbean Community; the free-trade
agreement between the United States and Israel; the Association of South East Asia Nations
(ASEAN); the free trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand; and the United States
and Canada free trade agreement. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Bennett & Hakkio, supra note 56, at 14; see also Cheng, supra note 109, at I
(discussing possible trade barriers due to trade blocs).
113. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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denomination of the currency involved in the transaction." 5 The
distinction between different types of banking activities is not always
clear when transactions involve borrowers, depositors, banks, and
currency from different countries." 6 However, classifying banking
activities provides a useful starting point for understanding the nature
and importance of today's Euromarket.
1 7
Domestic banking consists of domestic currency transactions with
borrowers and depositors who are residents of the country where the
bank is located." 8 Traditional foreign banking operations reflect the
longstanding bank practice of providing services to nonresidents, or
their agents, in the currency of the country where the bank is
domiciled."19 This practice is commonly associated with international
trade finance transactions.
20
In contrast, Eurocurrency12' banking activities occur when banks
in one country perform transactions in the currencies of other coun-
tries. 12 These foreign currency transactions involve either residents
or nonresidents of the country where the bank operates.'23 The term
115. R. JOHNSTON, THE EcoNomIcs OF THE EuRo-MARKET: HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY
1 (1982) [hereinafter JOHNSTON].
116. Id. at 2. The relationship between the domicile of the borrower and the currency











117. Id. at 1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 1.
121. Eurocurrency is money deposited by corporations and national governments in banks
away from their home countries. The Eurodollar is only one of the Eurocurrencies, though it
is the most prevalently used currency. J. DowNEs & J. GOODMAN, BARRON'S FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 252 (2d-ed. 1987) [hereinafter DoWNEs & GOODMAN].
122. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 1-2.
123. Id. at 2.
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"Euro" is usually retained even for deposits in accounts located
outside Europe.l' 4 Thus, any deposit of a currency outside that
currency's country of origin is called "Euro." 12 Banks which operate
in this market are called Eurobanks. 126
International bank lending covers banking activities with non-
residents in both domestic and foreign currency. 127 International bank
lending activities include all traditional foreign banking transac-
tions.'2 Additionally, international bank lending includes some Eu-
124. D. LoiAx & P. GuTmANN, THE EuRo,RKETs AND INTERNATIONAL FINANcIAL POLICiES
4, 12 (1981) [hereinafter LomAx & Gu.miN]. For example, dollars deposited in Canadian
banks or Japanese banks are referred to as Eurodollars and are traded on the Euromarkets,
even though the banks are not situated in Europe. There are Euromarkets in Luxembourg,
the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Singapore and Hong Kong. Id.
125. For the purposes of this Comment, the deposits are located in Europe. The Second
Banking Directive only affects countries of the EEC.
126. S. DAVIS, THE EuRo-BANK, ITs ORiNs, MANAGEMENT & OuTLooK 39-40 (2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter DAvis]. Few Eurobanks operate in each activity described below, the most
common activity engaged in by a Eurobank is Eurocurrency lending and deposit taking which
is necessary in order to acquire the funds to loan. The range of possible Eurobank activities
includes:
(1) taking of call, short date and fixed date Euro-currency deposits of up to
several years from the interbank market and customers to fund the bank's own loan
portfolio and for relending in the interbank market;
(2) exchange dealing in spot and forward Euro-currencies and often the local
currency of the stockholder for the account of clients, the bank's own position or
to create deposits through the swap;
(3) Euro-currency lending for the bank's own book on a rollover or fixed rate
basis from short dates to medium-term (the latter having exceeded ten years at
various times in recent years) to governments and government agencies, corporations
and individuals throughout the world on a secured or unsecured basis. Often lending
activity in the local currency of the market in which the bank is located represents
a significant portion of the portfolio;
(4) management of Euro-currency rollover loans on an underwriting or best efforts
basis to be placed with the stockholder group or a wider range of banks;
(5) origination, management, underwriting and selling of publicly issued Euro-
bonds and Euro-equities; provision of a secondary trading market in Euro-bonds;
(6) arrangement of private placements of fixed-rate debt issues in a variety of
currencies with international investors;
(7) corporate finance activities such as project structuring, corporate restructuring
and mergers and acquisitions;
(8) provision of traditional trade finance or correspondent banking services through
the opening of letters of credit, acceptance finance, money transfer and collection;
(9) portfolio management for international investors;
(10) arrangement of lease finance either with or without the use of a tax shield;
(11) arrangement of export finance through one or more national export credit
agencies;
(12) the taking of equity participations either on an outright basis or in connection
with the extension of a loan;
(13) specialist project financing capability in sectors such as energy and shipping.
Few Euro-banks are active in all these sectors, and many limit themselves for practical purposes
to Euro-currency lending and the deposit and exchange dealing necessary to support this
activity. Id.
127. JOHNsTON, supra note 115, at 2.
128. Id.
202
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rocurrency transactions; however, not all international lending is in
Eurocurrency. 29 The Eurocurrency market has consistently expanded,
growing from a gross market size of $1,524 billion in 1980, to $4,461
billion in 1987.130 Although only a part of the international lending
and Eurocurrency markets, the Eurodollar13 1 market is the most
important because the dollar is the primary currency of international
trade.' 32 Although U.S. banking policy helped create the Eurodollar
market, 33 the EEC policies embodied in the Second Directive will
affect the future of the Eurodollar market.
1 34
B. Creating Eurodollars
Tracing a series of international transactions involving corporations
and their banks illustrates how Eurodollars are created. 135 The cor-
porations, as bank depositors, seek the highest return on their de-
posits. Yet when borrowing funds, corporations desire to use funds
deposited in banks at the lowest interest rate. Banks function as
intermediaries, transferring the dollars of depositors to borrowers in
need of dollars.' 36
For instance, assume West German Corporation (WGC) sells a
product to United States Corporation (USC) for one million U.S.
dollars. WGC receives payment from USC in dollars drawn on USC's
bank, Citibank. Also assume WGC banks with Bank of America
maintaining a typical non-interest bearing checking account. After
completing the sales transaction, WGC's bank account would increase
by one million dollars, and Bank of America would show an increase
in liabilities reflecting the amount owed to WGC. Bank of America
129. Id. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
130. World Financial Markets, MORGAN GuARANrY TR. Co. 1980 & 1987, reprinted in
SAPmio, supra note 61, at 672. The Euromarket was measured in dollars for statistical
purposes. But in the actual Euromarket, the amount of dollars as a percentage of the overall
Eurocurrency market declined from 75% ($1143 billion) in 1980 to 66% ($2944 billion) in
1987. However, the dollar is still the predominate currency in the Eurocurrency market. Id.
131. A Eurodollar is "U.S. currency held in banks outside the United States, mainly in
Europe, and commonly used for settling international transactions." DowaNs & GOODMAN,
supra note 121, at 252.
132. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 261-82 and accompanying text.
135. This section draws heavily from SHApmo, supra note 61, at 673-77, and from P.
L'DERT, INTERNATioNAL EcoNoMIcs 500-02 (8th ed. 1986).
136. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing interest rate differentials
and bank profits).
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may now lend the additional one million dollars on deposit to
borrowers. 13
7
Efficient cash management 38 would require WGC to transfer the
money held on deposit at Bank of America into an interest bearing
investment such as an Eurocertificate of deposit.'39 WGC writes a
check on its Bank of America account and deposits the money in
Barclays Bank, London, England. When the check is received by
Bank of America, the dollar amount owed to WGC is reduced by
one million dollars and the amount owed to Barclays is increased by
one million dollars. Barclays in turn has now increased the amount
owed to WGC and has one million dollars to loan. 140
Bank of America has not increased its total liabilities, rather, there
has been a change in ownership of the deposit. Since Bank of America
137. WGC would show an increase in assets of $1 million and Bank of America would
show an increase of liabilities of $1 million, This transaction can be illustrated through the
use of a T account used by accountants to keep track of amounts owed from others and










138. TaM ExacuTrv COURSE 69 (G. Germane ed. 1986). "Cash management involves
managing the funds of the firm in order to obtain maximum cash availability and maximum
interest income on any idle funds." Id.
139, Eurocertificate of deposit: U.S. dollar denominated CDs issued by banks outside the
United States. The CDs have their interest and principal paid in dollars. The interest rates of
these CDs are usually pegged to the London Interbank Offered Rate [hereinafter LIBOR].
DowNs & GOODMAN, supra note 121, at 252.
140. The dollars are physically located with Bank of America, but because Barclays has
them on deposit in the account they maintain with Bank of America, Barclays can lend the
dollars to corporations or governments who are in need of borrowing dollars. If Barclays has
no corporation or government in need of dollars, it can lend the money to another bank which
has a need for dollars at LIBOR. Barclays has recorded an asset, because Bank of America
now owes $1 million to Barclays:
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owes the one million dollars to Barclays instead of to WGC, Bank
of America transfers the dollars into Barclays' account. 141 WGC has
not increased the amount of dollars it holds, but has merely trans-
ferred its original one million dollars to Barclays in order to receive
interest on the deposit. The dollars on deposit with Barclays are now
considered Eurodollars because the dollars have been deposited in a
bank outside the United States. 42
Barclays Bank is now paying interest on the Eurocertificate of









asset: Demand liability: Time
deposit with deposit due WGC









141. Major banks maintain deposit accounts with each other so that transactions such as
this can be conducted on a routine basis. Barclays is free to withdraw the funds from its
account with Bank of America or it can leave the funds there in case Barclays has to transfer
funds back to Bank of America in another transaction.
142. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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million dollars it has as an asset against Bank of America. The
difference between what Barclays pays on Eurocertificates of deposit
and the amount it charges on loans made to borrowers is the margin
providing Barclays with its gross profit. 43 Barclays deducts its op-
erating expenses'" from gross profit to determine its operating profit.
Administrative expenses, such as complying with regulatory require-
ments, can be a significant operating expense to banks. Competition
in the Eurodollar market produces narrow margins between the cost
of obtaining deposits and the interest rate charged to borrowers.1
45
Some banks have lower operating expenses than others because they
are more efficient, are located in Member States with less stringent
regulatory requirements, or a combination of these two factors. Banks
with. lower operating expenses have a competitive advantage.
Even if Barclays does not have a client with an immediate need
to borrow dollars, Barclays must pay interest on the Eurocertificate
of deposit. Therefore, Barclays would make an interbank loan
46 of
the one million dollars to another bank that does not have sufficient
dollars on deposit, but has a client wishing to borrow dollars. Suppose
Barclays lends the one million dollars to Belgian Bank. Barclays
would shift the one million dollars from its asset account with Bank
of America to an account for Belgian Bank which earns interest.
Barclays is then making the most efficient use of the money it has
on deposit with Bank of America. 147 Belgian Bank will have a liability
due to Barclays, but Belgian Bank will earn a profit on the margin
143. The excess of the net revenue from sales over the cost of merchandise sold (in this
case the cost of the Eurocertificate of deposit or cost of funds) is called gross profit or gross
margin. It is called "gross" because operating expenses must be deducted from it. P. FEss &
C. WARE, FNAN L Accoumn:No 120 (2d ed. 1985).
144. Id. Operating Expenses can be grouped into selling expenses, those expenses incurred
directly and entirely in connection with the sale of product, and General or Administrative
Expenses, or those indirect expenses commonly known as overhead. Complying with supervisory
requirements are operating expenses. Id.
145. P. Enzio, Tn EuRo-DoLAR SYsraM 144 (5th ed. 1973) [hereinafter EINZoI.
146. Interbank loans exist because:
For any individual bank the inflow and outflow of funds from deposits and loans
will not always-or even usually-be matching. The bank can maintain a stock of
liquidity assets, cash or precautionary balances to act as a buffer between the inflows
and outflows of funds. Alternatively it can borrow or lend funds with other banks.
Thus, for example, if an individual Euro-bank receives new deposits unexpectedly it
will usually be able to lend these temporarily to other banks in the London interbank
market, earning a small return ....
JoHNsToN, supra note 115, at 98.
147. Barclays would prefer to lend the funds to a client at a rate greater than LIBOR, but
since Barclays currently does not have a client in need of dollars, Barclays can" earn interest
at LIBOR by lending to Belgian Bank.
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between the interest it pays to Barclays and the interest charged to
its client.
41
The supply of Eurodollars has increased from one million to two
million because WGC and Belgian Bank each own one million
Eurodollars. This multiplier 49 turns small changes in bank deposits
148. The cost of the funds to Belgian Bank will be the amount charged in interest by
Barclays. Interbank loans are generally pegged to a standard measure called the LIBOR, the
interest rate that the most credit worthy international banks dealing in Eurodollars charge each
other for large loans. LIBOR is the bench mark rate for Eurodollar loans to corporate or
government borrowers possessing greater risk. DowNs & GOODMAN, supra note 121, at 330-
31.
Usually this rate is higher than the amount of interest Barclays must pay on its Eurocertificate
of deposit, but even if Barclays is charging Belgian Bank less interest than it is paying to
WGC, it is still better for Barclays to lend the funds and receive some interest income from
Belgian Bank than it is for Barclays to receive no interest income while paying interest to



















deposit in Interbank loan
Bank of America due Barclays $1mm
$1mm
149. The "multiplier," or "credit multiplier," is defined as:
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into large changes in the amount of outstanding credit and in the
money supply.'50 The U.S. Federal Reserve,'-" through open market
operations, 5 2 influences interest rates by manipulating the money
Strictly, the ratio of the change in the volume of lending by a group of deposit-
taking FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES (and especially banks) to the change in
reserve assets which initiated the change (this may be an increase or decrease). More
commonly, in the traditional theory of CREDIT CREATION by the banks, it
denotes the ratio of change in bank deposit liabilities, caused by the increased
extension of CREDIT, to the initiating change in reserve assets. In this case it is
sometimes called the 'bank deposit multiplier'. However applied, the size of the
multiplier depends on the RESERVE RATIOS maintained by the institutions con-
cerned, and the scale of leakages of reserve assets from these institutions induced
by the credit change itself.
EcoNoMIcS DicTIoNARY, supra note 16, at 90.
150. Pozdena, Eliminating Reserve Requirements, FED. RE SERvE BANK OF SAN FRANcisco,
WEEKLY LETTER (Sept. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Pozdena]. The traditional view of monetary policy
emphasizes the use of reserve requirements for transaction-type deposits (usually checking
accounts) as a way to influence the money supply, interest rates, and thereby indirectly control
the overall economy. The central bank influences the quantity of transaction-type deposits by
manipulating the supply of reserves to affect either the money supply or interest rates. Id.
Large reserve requirements force banks to withhold money from the economy and interest
rates rise, while low reserve requirements allow banks to lend more of the money they have
on deposit and the increased supply of money lowers interest rates. Id.
151. "Federal Reserve System" is defined as:
The system established in the USA in 1913 to discharge the function of a CENTRAL
BANK and provide a strengthened framework of regulatory control over the com-
mercial banking system. The System has a federal structure, comprising 12 Federal
Reserve Banks each responsible for day-to-day operations within their Districts and
acting as a two-way channel of contact between the System and the business
community; and a Federal Reserve Board of Governors, located in Washington,
which effectively if not formally controls the policy of the System. All banks
registered under Federal laws are obliged to be members and observe the regulations
of the System; for banks chartered under state laws membership is optional. The
System is responsible for currency issue; holds reserve balances (other than vault
cash) of member banks; acts as LENDER OF LAST RESORT and provider of
LIQUIDITY through discount facilities; operates on the volume of BANK DEPOS-
ITS and on the level and structure of INTEREST RATES by setting minimum
reserve requirements for member banks and engaging in OPEN MARKET OPER-
ATIONS (under the Federal Open Market Committee); is responsible for MONE-
TARY MANAGEMENT and MONETARY POLICY within the USA and in
conjunction with the Treasury for EXCHANGE RATE policy and external monetary
relations. Although a creation of government, with the Federal Reserve Board
Governors (and the Chairman) being appointed by the President, the System has
generally maintained a considerable independence in its own policy decisions, and
in its comment on wider economic events and policies.
EcoNoMIcs DICTiONARY, supra note 16, at 150.
152. "Open market operations" are defined as:
Sales or purchases of marketable SECURITIES conducted in the open market by
the CENTRAL BANK as an instrument of control over the monetary system. The
immediate objective of such sales may be to influence the quantity of reserve assets
held by the banking system, with the further purpose of affecting the volume of
banks' lending and holdings of other assets: open market sales will contract the
RESERVE BASE and compel a reduction in banks' loans and other assets. The
further effect of this is to change the quantity of bank deposits and so the MONEY
SUPPLY. The traditional theory of the CREDIT MULTIPLIER predicts that banks
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supply. 15 3 In the Eurodollar market, the multiplier affects the supply
of dollars in the same manner as in the U.S. domestic market.
However, the Eurodollar market is beyond the control of the U.S.
Federal Reserve because the dollars are deposited outside the United
States. 154 The effect of the multiplier in the Euromarket may offset
U.S. Federal Reserve actions to control the domestic supply of dollars
in two ways: 1) Eurodollar deposits held by domestic residents may
partially substitute for the domestic money supply; and 2) Euromarket
lending to domestic residents may offset the effects of monetary
policy on credit.'-5
The cycle of lending,, depositing, and re-lending is the basis for
the Eurodollar market. In the above example, the total amount of
foreign controlled dollars in Bank of America remains constant at
one million dollars, but because of the impact of the multiplier,
many transactions can be funded. Eurodollar transactions differ from
those occurring solely in the domestic market because they involve a
chain of ownership between depositors and banks with changing
control over the deposits.156 Deposits held domestically are owned by
the depositor and funds are withdrawn from the depositor's demand
deposit account to pay third parties. When this occurs, the liability
to the depositor on the bank's books will be reduced. With Euro-
will change by some multiple of the initiating open market operation. In practice
central banks' objectives are usually more complex. Open market operations may
be conducted as an adjunct of INTEREST RATE policy, which may have a
BALANCE OF PAYMENT objective, or may itself be a means of influencing money
supply by affecting the asset-holding decisions of the public.
EcoNoMIcs DIcTIoNARY, supra note 16, at 310.
153. Moreno, Euromarkets and Monetary Policy, FED. RESERv BAN OF SAN FRA.cisco,
WEEKLY LETTER (Jan. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Moreno]. For further discussion, see infra notes
154-55 and accompanying text.
154. See Moreno, supra note 153.
155. See id. See also EiNzio, supra note 145, at 138-39, from which this partial list is
extracted. The creation of the Euromarket has changed both domestic and international finance.
The United States has been affected because the dollar is the predominate currency traded on
the Euromarket. The following describes some of the economic consequences resulting from
the Eurodollar market: 1) the Eurodollar market has produced a structure of international
interest rates distinct and independent from interest rates existing domestically; 2) domestic
interest rates are more dependent on international influences; 3) there is a more even inter-
national allocation of financial resources; 4) the influence of international interest rates on
domestic interest rates reduces the discrepancies between interest rates in various countries; 5)
because of the freedom of currency movement there are lending and borrowing opportunities
in the markets and on the terms most favorable to the borrower (for large sophisticated
borrowers); 6) Eurodollar activity arguably causes monetary expansion by duplicating the use
of the same deposits and transferring idle deposits to those more willing to actively borrow
or lend. Id. at 138-40.
156. Scpmo, supra note 61, at 676.
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dollars, the initial liability remains, but the party to whom the liability
is owed changes.
Banking transactions alone cannot explain the reasons for the
development and growth of the Eurodollar market. The Eurodollar
market developed because of the increased use of the dollars in
financing international trade and the convenience- to Europeans of
holding dollars in Europe rather than in the United States. It is also
necessary to consider how U.S. regulatory policy during the 1960s
and 1970s unintentionally promoted the use of Eurodollars. Today,
the market exists and continues to grow in large part because America
continues to import more goods and services than it exports, and
foreign corporations choose to deposit the dollars they receive into
Eurobanks. The following section discusses how the Eurodollar mar-
ket developed.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROMARKET AND A COMPARISON
BETWEEN REGULATORY PRACTICES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND WEST
GERMANY
A. The Eurodollar's Origin
After the Second World War, the United States exported more
goods and services than it imported.1 57 By the late 1950s, a significant
turnaround in the U.S. balance of payments' 58 occurred because the
United States began to run trade deficits. 59 As the volume of dollars
flowing into Europe increased, European governments and corpora-
tions began using dollars to finance international trade transactions,
greatly enhancing the dollar's role as the predominant international
reserve currency. 160
Prior to 1958, the vast majority of Europeans held their dollar
deposits in U.S. banks. By 1958, as European holders of dollars
began to recognize the ease of managing their dollar deposits in
Western European banks, a European market in dollars became
established. 16 Additionally in 1958, most European countries agreed
157. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 9.
158. The balance of payments is the system which records all of the country's economic
transactions over time. See DowaNs & GOODMAN, supra note 121, at 180.
159. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 9.
160. Id.
161. See Emz, supra note 145, at 31-32. (European governments and corporations found
daily management of finances easier due to convenience of time zones and savings in
communication costs).
210
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to allow their currencies to be freely convertible into dollars for the
first time since the end of the Second World War. 62 Convertibility
eased capital movements across national frontiers, promoting inter-
national trade transactions financed primarily with dollars.'
63
1. The Need to Hold Dollars in Europe
The origin of the Eurodollar dates back to the Cold War. 16
Communist Bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, feared that
their dollar deposits located in the United States might be frozen
during a period of political tension.' 65 The Soviets also feared that
creditors of Imperial Russia would attach growing Soviet deposits
held in U.S. banks.'" Another version of the Eurodollar's origin
credits the Chinese with creating the Eurodollar. In 1949, the Chinese
Communist government began depositing dollars in the Soviet bank
in Paris.' 67 Later, the Soviets themselves began depositing dollars in
Europe. 1
68
The Soviets' financial motivation was the desire to prepare the
ground for borrowing Eurodollars at a later stage.' 69 By establishing
banking relationships in Europe, the Soviets hoped to borrow dollars
to finance international trade transactions on occasions when they
lacked dollar deposits. 170 While other borrowers continued to hold
162. See JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 10; A. SmnisoN, THE MONEY LENDERS, BANKERS
AND A WORLD IN Ttumon; 109 (1981) [hereinafter SIvwsoN] (only Great Britain failed to return
to convertibility in 1958).
163. SIMPSON, supra note 162, at 109.
164. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union began in the years
immediately after the Second World War. The warlike tensions between the two countries
became known as the Cold War to distinguish it from a shooting or "hot" war. See G.
KENNAN, MEMOIRS 265-528 (1967), for an excellent discussion of the early years of the Cold
War by this high ranking United States diplomat who was intimately involved in U.S.-Soviet
relations at that time.
165. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, at 10. For example, the United States could deny the
Soviets access to their dollar deposits in retaliation for a Soviet aggression, or to influence
Soviet behavior by threatening to prevent them from using dollars in financing international
transactions. Id.
166. EiNzaG, supra note 145, at 30.
167. SIMPSON, supra note 162, at 109. See also EiNzxo, supra note 145, at 30 (Soviets may
also have attempted to conceal dollar deposits from U.S. authorities).
168. EiNziG, supra note 145, at 30.
169. Id.
170. Id. The author notes that:
At the beginning the rates they [the Soviets] were prepared to accept on the Euro-
dollar deposits were slightly below the standard rates, for the sake of establishing
relationship with those Western European banks which until then were not prepared
to have any dealings with them. Before very long they [the Soviets] were able to
obtain standard rates.
Id.
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dollars in the United States in anticipation of future borrowing, the
Eurodollar market proved to be a natural alternative for the Soviets
as U.S. banks were prohibited from lending to Communist coun-
tries.' 7' Thus, the Soviets began depositing their dollars in Soviet
owned banks such as Banque Commerciale de l'Europe du Nord, in
Paris, and Moscow Narodny Bank, in London. 172
2. The Emergence of London as a Eurodollar Center
In the years immediately after the Second World War, the foreign
currency business of banks consisted of traditional foreign banking. 73
The Pound Sterling remained the major currency of international
trade, so London continued as the financial center of Europe. 74
Eventually, the dollar began to replace the pound as the major
currency of international trade. However, London continued as Eu-
rope's dominant financial center ". . . thanks to its excellent technical
organization and to the abundance of specialized personnel which
were lacking in other markets. Consequently, the market which has
come to be called the Eurodollar market developed in London.'f175
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, London was the only financial
center where both borrowers and depositors could complete dollar
transactions at any time. 76 In contrast, continental Eurodollar mar-
kets, with the exception of Frankfurt and Zurich, contained more
borrowers than depositors. 77
Since the 1950s, dollars have increasingly flowed into the Euro-
dollar market. 78 The internationalization of banking and the growth
of the Eurodollar market has been stimulated by national regulatory
policies in both Europe and the United States. 79 During the 1960s
and 1970s, U.S. banking policy unintentionally promoted the use of
Eurodollars by European governments as well as domestic and mul-
tinational corporations.
171. Id.
172. Id. The cable address for the Banque Commerciale pour I'Europe du Nord was
'Eurobank.' Id.
173. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
174. JoHNsToN, supra note 115, at 9.
175. EINZIO, supra note 145, at 8 (quoting French financial commentator Paul Turot in
the April 1961 issue of BArQuE).
176. Id. at 14.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
179. JomsToN, supra note 115, at 12.
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3. Influence of United States Regulation
During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States adopted regulations
applicable to domestic banks limiting the flow of dollars out of the
country. 180 The demand for international financing in dollars shifted
to the Euromarket because domestic regulations did not affect foreign
branches of U.S. banks or foreign banks. 181 In 1968, U.S. regulations
restricted the ability of American corporations to borrow dollars
domestically for expenditures incurred overseas. 82 Additionally, in-
terest rate ceilings on deposits, imposed by the U.S. Federal Reserve,
allowed overseas banks to attract dollar deposits because they offered
accounts with no interest rate ceilings.183 The lack of reserve and
regulatory requirements in the Eurodollar market allowed for high
interest rates on Eurodollar deposits. 8 4 Except for three month
deposits in 1958, Eurodollar rates on time deposits were consistently
higher than U.S. interest rates. 85
Although the United States has changed its regulatory policies as
well as phased out interest rate ceilings, the Euromarket continues
to grow. 8 6 However, U.S. domestic banks are still subject to reserve
180. Id. (regulations such as the Interest Equalization Tax (IET) and Foreign Direct
Investment regulations).
181. Id.
182. SHaimo, supra note 61, at 672-73 (regulations from United States Office of Foreign
Direct Investment (OFDI)). American corporations began looking to the Eurodollar markets
to finance international operations. Id. at 673.
183. Id. at 672 (interest rate ceilings were imposed in Regulation Q).
184. Ein ziG, supra note 145, at 168. The IET, introduced in 1963 and later repealed,
affected the early stages of the development of the Euromarket. The IET taxed interest on
foreign debt sold in the United States, thereby raising to the cost of borrowing by foreigners
in the United States to unacceptable levels. SAtmPo, supra note 61, at 672-73.
185. An example of the impact of Regulation Q on the early development of the Eurodollar
market is that
[u]nder Regulation Q the maximum interest rates American banks were permitted
to allow on time deposits from 1957 to 1961 were 1 per cent from thirty to ninety
days, 2 1/2 per cent from ninety days to six months, and 3 per cent over six months.
From April 1968, they were permitted to pay 5 1/2 per cent from three months to
six months, and 6 1/4 per cent over six months. Although Euro-dollar rates had
their ups and downs, they were all the time -except in 1958 for three months'
deposits-higher than any of these rates. Even after the virtual repeal of this
restriction American banks [were] not permitted to pay interest on deposits for less
than thirty days.
Eiwzia, supra note 145, at 28.
186. Despite the repeal of the JET and OFDI regulations, and the fact that Regulation Q
has been phased out for Certificates of deposits of over $100,000, the Euromarket has continued
to expand:
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requirements and regulatory expenses such as Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation'8 7  fees. 8 1 Since Eurobanks do not incur these
expenses, a greater proportion of Eurobank deposits can be lent to
borrowers. Therefore, the interest rate on each dollar lent can be
lower than the interest rate charged by a bank which must hold a
larger proportion of its deposits on reserve.8 9
Governments and multinational corporations find it more conven-
ient to participate in the Eurodollar market than in the U.S. domestic
market. Well known to the lender, and regularly active in the
Eurodollar market, these borrowers require less cumbersome
paperwork' 90 and disclosure procedures than do borrowers of dollars
within the United States.191 Eurobanks may lend dollars to borrowers
which U.S. banks may not be willing to provide absent additional
disclosure by the borrowers. 92
U.S. regulatory policy promoted the development of the Eurodollar
market. Additionally, the regulatory policies of each EEC Member
Eurocurrency Market Size, Measured by Liabilities in Dollars (Billion)












SEApmo, supra note 61, at 672-73 (quoting World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust).
187. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC] is a federal agency which was
established in 1933. The FDIC guarantees, within limits, funds on deposit in member banks
and performs other functions such as making loans to or buying assets from member banks
to facilitate mergers or prevent failures. DowNs & GOODMAN, supra note 121, at 258.
188. SHAPmo, supra note 61, at 678.
189. Id. For example, a three percent reserve requirement equates to about a 25 basis point
cost disadvantage in the loan market at the interest rates prevailing in the American market
in September 1989. Pozdena, supra note 150.
A basis point is the smallest measurement of quoting yields on bonds and bank loans. One
basis point equals 0.01%. DowNis & GOODMAN, supra note 121, at 183. If a borrower intends
to borrow $1 million for one year paying interest monthly, an additional 25 basis points
equates to an additional $30,000 in interest expense to the borrower over the course of the
year. With multimillion dollar loan transactions, a few basis points can be the difference
between one bank or another getting the client.
190. Because governments and multinational corporations present a lesser credit risk and
borrow in the Eurodollar market on a more frequent basis than smaller sized corporations,
there is less credit analysis and loan documentation done by banks than when smaller
corporations borrow on the Eurodollar market.
191. En 2zx, supra note 145, at 144-45, 168.
192. Id. at 168.
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State affect the Eurodollar market in that country. A comparison of
the banking laws of Great Britain and West Germany reveals how
the Eurodollar market functions in different EEC banking systems.
B. A Comparison of Banking Regulations Between Great Britain
and West Germany
Each EEC Member State has its own distinct financial system with
unique institutional characteristics impacting on the country's ap-
proach to regulation. 193 Some countries have highly concentrated
banking systems with informal regulatory controls based on close
institutional arrangements between regulators and bank manage-
ment.194 Other countries have a more fragmented banking industry
requiring formal methods and control. 95 Despite attempts to coor-
dinate regulation of banks among EEC Members, disparities and
gaps remain in the regulatory system. 9
6
The decision to operate a bank in a particular European country
is strongly influenced by the economic, regulatory, and financial
market structure of that particular country. 197 Legally related issues
include the country's tax structure, exchange controls, ratio, and
other requisite regulatory requirements imposed by the host coun-
try. 19 Non-legal issues include the operating cost structure,' 99 the
193. R. DALE, BANK SUPERvIsION AIouND mE WoRuD 2 (1982) [hereinafter DALE].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. For example, a gap in the regulatory structure exists because in many instances,
neither the country where a bank branch is domiciled, nor the country where the parent bank
is domiciled, monitors or regulates liquidity in the Eurocurrency markets. Id. at 3.
197. DAvis, supra note 126, at 35.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text discussing operating costs.
A bank's cost structure represents the expenses incurred by a bank in providing a loan to
a borrower. The banks with the higher cost structures must charge more in interest to the
borrower in order to earn the same 27.25 basis points spread on the loan. The following is
an example of the cost structure of two banks:
Bank A Bank B
Loan Interest Rate*+ 9.0625% 9.3125%
Cost of Funds** (8.44%) (8.44%)
Administrative Costs . (.25%) (.50%)***
Credit Risk (.10%) (.10%)
Interest Rate Spread .2725% .2725%
• The Loan Interest Rate represents the closing LIBOR rate of 8.4375% for three month
Eurodollar loans on March 2, 1990, as reported in the Wall Street Journal on March 5, 1990,
plus an additional .625% for Bank A, and an additional .8725% for Bank B.
+ By comparison the U.S. Prime Rate was 10% on March 2, 1990, as reported in the Wall
Street Journal on March 5, 1990. The LIBOR with the premium added by the banks is still
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extent of barriers to accepting local deposit business, the availability
of a professional work force, a well as the country's time zone and
communication capability in relation to other financial markets. 2°°
These institutional factors dictate the regulatory climate and operation
of the banking system, which in turn determines the international
competitiveness of that country's banks.
Great Britain traditionally has maintained one of the least regulated
banking systems in the world.20 1 In contrast, the Federal Republic of
Germany2 2 structures its banking system with more rigid controls.203
Because Great Britain and West Germany have divergent practices
in the area of bank regulation, comparing their respective banking
laws will assist in understanding the necessity for harmonizing bank-
ing laws throughout the EEC. This comparison is not intended to
be an all-encompassing statement of the current banking laws in
either country, but should illustrate how different historical experi-
ences and institutional relationships among banks, regulatory agen-
cies, and governments affect banking practices in each country. The
banking practices of other EEC Member States2'4 will be noted where
they differ significantly from the practices in Great Britain and West
Germany.
1. Historical Development
The banking, financial, and commercial network of Great Britain
is located in London, a financial center of great tradition and prestige
in the world of finance. 20s The Bank of England, established in
lower than the bench mark U.S. lending rate, without consideration for premiums added to
the Prime Rate by U.S. domestic banks.
** The Euro-CD rate banks pay to attract the deposits needed to fund loans is known as
the banks cost of funds. The closing rate on March 2, 1990, was 8.44% for a three month
Eurodollar deposit as reported in the Wall Street Journal on March 5, 1990.
*** Bank B incurs higher administrative costs or overhead either because it must meet more
rigorous supervisory requirements in its home Member State, or because Bank A operates
more efficiently than Bank B, or a combination of these factors.
200. DAviS, supra note 126, at 35.
201. See Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 200-01.
202. This Comment only discusses the development of the West German banking system.
The development of the East German banking system and the implications of East and West
German reunification for the EEC are beyond the scope of this Comment.
203. See Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 200-01.
204. The other Member States which are active in the Eurodollar market and whose bank
regulatory practices fall between the extremes of Great Britain and West Germany include
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See generally DALE, supra note 193 (describing
bank supervision in these countries).
205. S. MASTROPASQuA, Tan BAicNo SYsaTM iN noE CouT~ms oF nm EEC: INsTrrU-
TioNAL AND STRUcTuRAL ASpECTS 82 (1978) [hereinafter MASTROPASQUA].
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1694,206 is considered the world's first currency issuing bank and
holds a special place in the British banking system.3 By 1928, the
Bank of England had acquired a monopoly on issuing currency, and
in 1946 the Bank was nationalized. 208 Since its nationalization, the
Bank of England's primary function has been to determine the
country's monetary policy in accord with the government's Treasury
Department; however, the Bank also carries out some ordinary
banking operations.209 Traditionally, the British banking system has
been characterized by a relative lack of laws. 210 In fact, there is no
legal definition of a bank and no official authorization is required
before a new bank begins collecting deposits.
21
In contrast to the long banking tradition of Great Britain, Germany
did not develop modern banking practices until the nineteenth cen-
tury, coinciding with the growth of industrialization in the new
German state. 212 The present organization of the West German bank-
ing system was put in place during the aftermath of the Second
World War.213 In 1946, the pre-War central bank, the Reichsbank,
was replaced by eleven regional currency issuing banks called Lan-
dezentralbanken.214 These regional bank activities were coordinated
by the Bank Deutscher Lander, following policies established by the
British, French, and American authorities in charge of the territory
206. Bank of England Act, 1694, 5 & 6 W. & M., ch. 20, reprinted in 4 HAMsBURY's
STATUTES oF ENGLAND AND WAs 435 (4th ed. 1987).
207. MASTROPASQUA, supra note 205, at 82.
208. Bank of England Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 27, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY's
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALEs 449 (4th ed. 1987). The purpose of this Act was to bring
the capital stock of the Bank of England into public ownership and bring the Bank under
public control, making provisions with respect to the relations between the Bank of England,
the Treasury, and other banks. Id. See also MASTROPASQUA, supra note 205, at 83 (history of
Bank of England).
209. MASTROPAsQUA, supra note 205, at 83.
210. Id. at 81.
211. Id. at 83, 91. Supervision by the Bank of England is based on tradition, and banks
starting operations should accept this supervision if they want recognition in the banking
community. Id.
212. Id. at 99. The historical development of banking systems in other EEC Member States
varies greatly. Belgium, like West Germany, did not form the National Bank of Belgium,
Banque Nationale de Belgique, until the mid-19th century. Id. at 20. Luxembourg, due to its
union with Belgium which has produced a joint monetary, foreign exchange, and foreign trade
system, has no central bank at all. LomAx & GuTmANN, supra note 124, at 142; MASTROPASQUA,
supra note 205, at 40. However, the Netherlands, like Great Britain, has a banking tradition
dating to the 17th century. The Netherlands continues to the present day to be an international
banking center. Id. at 1.
213. See MAsTROPASQUA, supra note 205, at 99. The Act of 21 June 1948 created the post-
War banking system. Id.
214. Id.
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which today is West Germany. 215 In 1957, the eleven regional central
banks were merged with the Bank Deutscher Lander to form the
current West German central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank.216
The Deutsche Bundesbank is the central bank of West Germany. 217
It issues currency as well as maintains the stability of the money
supply by controlling the circulation of money and the granting of
credit. 218 The most recent revision of banking legislation covering
bank supervision in West Germany was enacted in late 1984.219
2. The Institutional Structure of Bank Regulation
Traditionally, bank supervision in Great Britain was flexible, with
the monetary authorities regulating banks through the use of "moral
persuasion" and "gentlemen's agreements". 0 In response to the
harmonization requirements of the First Directive, Great Britain
adopted the Banking Act 1979,2' 1 which for the first time provided
a statutory basis for banking supervision.m2 In order to improve the
quality of bank supervision, Great Britain adopted the Banking Act
1987,22 which replaced virtually the entire Banking Act 1979.2 4 The
Banking Act 1987, consistent with British tradition as well as the
215. Id.
216. Id. at 99-100. The Act of 26 July 1957 reorganized the banking system. The English
translation of Deutsche Bundesbank is German Federal Bank, and the English translation is
used when quoting German banking law.
217. Id. at 100.
218. MAsTROPASQuA, supra note 205, at 100.
219. Banking Law of 20 December 1984, reprinted in M. PELTZER & J. BROOKS, GERAi
BANKiNG LAw (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter PLT ER & BROOKS].
220. Id. at 81. For example, as with the tradition in the domestic market, there have been
no limitations to the opening of branches abroad by British banks. However, the Bank of
England wants to be informed when British banks open such branches, and it does not look
favorably upon a British bank that conducts banking operations which are not authorized in
Great Britain. Id. at 91.
221. Banking Act, 1979, ch. 37, reprinted in 4 HAIsBuRY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALEs 457 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Banking Act 1979].
222. DALE, supra note 193, at 58. The Banking Act 1979, granted the Bank of England
primary responsibility for regulating and supervising deposit-taking business and for
this purpose establishes two categories of institution: recognized banks and licensed
deposit-takers. This two-tier system ... enables the Bank to maintain its traditional
approach to the supervision of recognized banks based on direct contacts with
management, while adopting more formal regulatory procedures in relation to licensed
deposit takers.
Id.
223. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 527 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Banking Act 1987].
224. See Lickorish, A Practitioner's Guide to the Banking Act 1987, 6 INT'L FIN. L. Rav.
25 (1987) [hereinafter Lickorish, Practitioner's Guide] (all but four sections ind one schedule
of the Banking Act 1979, were repealed).
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Second Directive, liberalized the banking system by allowing more
competition for consumer deposits.?
The Bank of England is the monetary authority charged with
supervision of banking activities in Great Britain. 2 6 It reviews devel-
opments in the field of banking relevant to its supervisory function.
227
After gaining authorization from the Treasury, the Bank of England
may issue directives to any bank for the purpose of assuring that a
recommendation is carried out by the bank.? The Bank of England
has opposed instituting a rigid system of bank supervision, such as
requiring banks to maintain a minimum capital ratio. 29 Rather, it
prefers to advise each bank based on the relationship of the bank's
capital and reserves to its banking practices. 20
West Germany has adopted a bifurcated bank regulatory structure,
with the Deutsche Bundesbank establishing policy and the Federal
Supervisory Authority actually supervising West German banks in
cooperation with the Deutsche Bundesbank.23 The Deutsche Bundes-
225. Banking Act 1987, supra note 223, at § 108, 2, sch. 7, pt. I. The notes to § 3 state:
The Banking Act 1979 ... established a system of recognition and licensing which
distinguished between banks and other deposit-taking institutions.... The supervi-
sory function of the Bank of England was intended to be more stringent in relation
to recognized banks. However, events proved ... that the two tier system of
regulation did not guarantee effective supervision. This Act [Banking Act 1987]
provides for a single system of authorization which in combination with stricter
requirements as to the conduct of business is intended to lead to more effective
supervision of banking practice.
Id. at § 3 notes.
226. Id. at § 1, 1.
227. Id. at 2. The Bank of England "[a]s soon as practicable after the coming into force
of this section ... shall establish a committee to be know as the Board of Banking
Supervision." Id. at § 2, 1.
228. MASTROPPASQuA, supra note 205, at 92. However, these powers have never been
exercised, since the central Bank has always preferred to exercise its powers of control over
banks and other financial institutions through voluntary and spontaneous collaboration. Id.
229. Id. at 93. In the Netherlands, the structure of the bank regulatory system is similar
to that of Great Britain's. The Nederlandsche Bank, like the Bank of England, is responsible
for enforcing bank regulations. Although structured like Great Britain, the Dutch regulatory
system is complex and rule oriented like the system in West Germany. The system of supervision
is highly formal, involving detailed regulations on solvency and liquidity requirements. The
Nederlandsche Bank has broad powers to inspect banks and verify financial records through
on-site inspection. See Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 179, 202;
DAx, supra note 193, at 47, 50.
230. MASTROPASQuA, supra note 205, at 93. Another commentator notes that
traditionally... [a] rule-based system has been viewed as unnecessary because of the
small number of major commercial banks (Barclays, Lloyds, National Westminster,
and Midland), the physical proximity of the Bank of England to each of the four,
and the long-standing pattern of frequent extensive discussions between senior bank
officers and representatives of the Bank of England.
Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 200.
231. PELTZER & BROOKS, supra note 219, §§ 6(1), 7(1) at 34. "The Federal Supervisory
Authority supervises the credit institutions in accordance with the provisions of this Law."
Id., § 6(1) at 34. Further, "[t]he Federal Supervisory Authority and the German Federal Bank
shall act in cooperation in accordance with this Law." Id., § 7(1) at 34.
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bank regulates the West German banking system by fixing the dis-
count rate, imposing obligatory reserves on banks, and conducting
open market operations. 22 Although the bank is a public institution
which is required to follow the general economic policy of the
government, it maintains complete independence in its operations. 233
Banking operations cannot begin in West Germany without written
authorization from the Federal Supervisory Authority.2 34 Authoriza-
tion may be refused if the funds destined for the exercise of banking
activities are considered insufficient or in cases where the promoters
and directors do not possess the requisite professional qualifica-
tions. 21 West German branches of foreign banks are supervised and
regulated in the same manner as domestic banks. 2 6 The Federal
Supervisory Authority and the Bundesbank have broad powers to
obtain information from banks .2 7 The Federal Supervisory Authority
and the Bundesbank review bank financial reports in order to deter-
mine what regulations and financial requirements will be imposed on
232. MASTROPAsQUA, supra note 205, at 100.
233. Id. at 100-01.
234. PELTZER & BROOKS, supra note 219, § 32(1) at 62. "Whoever intends to conduct
banking transactions ... in the territory in which this Law is effective shall require a written
licence from the Federal Supervisory Authority." Id.
235. Id., §§ 1(2), 33(1)-(2) at 31, 63. "Banking managers within the meaning of this Law
shall be those natural persons who, according to statute, articles of association or partnership
agreement, are appointed to manage and represent [authorization to bind the entity for which
the person acts] a credit institution organized as a body corporate or a partnership." Id., §
1(2) at 31.
The license may be refused only "if there exist facts which indicate that the applicant or
one of the persons referred to in § 1, paragraph (2), sentence 1,. is not reliable;" Id., § 33(1)
no. 2 at 63. The statute further states that:
The professional qualification of the persons named. . . to manage a credit institution
requires that they have sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge of banking
business as well as senior management experience. The professional qualification to
manage the affairs of a credit institution shall as a general rule be deemed to exist
if three years' service in an executive position with a credit institution of comparable
size and type of business is proven.
Id., § 33(2) at 63.
236. Id., § 53(l)-(2) at 76.
237. Id., § 26(1), (4) at 57.
[Ciredit institutions must prepare a balance sheet and profit and loss account
(financial statements) within the first three months of the financial year in respect
of the preceding financial year and file these financial statements and at a later date
the approved financial statements and management report ... with the Federal
Supervisory Authority and German Federal Bank; explanatory comments on the
financial statements shall be included in an annex to the balance sheet.
Id., § 26(1) at 57. "The Federal Minister of Justice can, in agreement with the Federal Minister
of Finances and with the German Federal Bank, issue decrees setting out detailed provisions
concerning the preparation of the financial statements ... to the extent this is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Federal Supervisory Authorities ... ." Id., § 26(4) at 57. See also
Friesen, Lending Supervision, (pt. 1), supra note 17, at 1097 (supervisory authorities have
broad powers to request information from banks).
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each bank.25 These institutions base their decisions on annual audi-
tors' reports submitted by banks rather than conducting on-site
inspections at each bank.239 After a consensus between the two is
reached, the Federal Supervisory Authority issues detailed regulations
on the financial requirements for banks.m These regulatory require-
ments coupled with close supervision distinguish the West German
banking system from that of Great Britain.24'
Because of its strict domestic banking laws, West German banks
conduct many international and Euromarket transactions outside of
West Germany.242 Since the Second World War, Luxembourg has
adopted liberal banking legislation which has attracted both foreign
banks and foreign investment.24 Luxembourg has therefore emerged
as an alternative location for West German banks seeking to conduct
international operations.2" If German banks had not operated in
Luxembourg and avoided the reserve requirements, they would have
been at a substantial disadvantage in the Euromarket.24
3. Regulation of Foreign Banks
A foreign bank subsidiary in Great Britain is regulated in the same
manner as a domestic bank.2 6 Determination of a subsidiary's finan-
238. PELTZER & BROOKS, supra note 219, § 11 at 41.
239. Id., § 27(1) at 59. "Before being approved, a credit institution's financial statements
with annex . . . shall be audited by one or more auditors.. . ." Id.
240. Id., § 10 at 36.
241. Belgium combines the supervisory structure of West Germany with the informal
attitude towards supervision of Great Britain. Belgium's supervisory structure places respon-
sibility for bank policy with the National Bank with the supervisory function belonging to the
Commission Bancaire (CB). Belgium differs from West Germany in that the CB prefers to act
in an informal manner similar to the practice in Great Britain. Commercial banks form a
small cohesive group which takes pride in its consultative relationship with the CB. Belgian
banks operate in an environment relatively free of strict rules and regulations. See MASRo-
PAsQuA, supra note 205, at 22; DALE, supra note 193, at 18. See also Friesen, International
Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 153, 168, 169, 171 (discussing different supervisory methods).
242. Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 1), supra note 17, at 1105. ".... [A] major
problem for bank regulators in the Federal Republic of Germany was the large number of
international loans made through foreign subsidiaries, especially in Luxembourg, that escaped
effective regulation. Recently adopted rules on consolidation will end the practice of circum-
venting domestic regulation by making loans through subsidiaries." Id.
243. MASTROPASQUA, supra note 205, at 39.
244. LormAx & GuA , supra note 124, at 142-44, 146. A number of factors have
combined to make Luxembourg attractive to foreign financial institutions. Luxembourg shares
borders with Belgium, France, and West Germany, and as a result its population is largely
trilingual. This language proficiency allows banks to conduct business for clients in any one
of these countries from one cost efficient location, Historically, German banks have operated
in Luxembourg, avoiding reserve requirements on international business imposed by West
German regulators. Id.
245. DAvis, supra note 126, at 35.
246. Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 1), supra note 17, at 1096. In the Netherlands,
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cial stability is made independently of the foreign parent organiza-
tion. 7 Branches of foreign banks, however, are treated differently
than subsidiaries.28 Authorization for branches to conduct banking
operations is based on the financial strength of the foreign parent
institution.u 9 Because branches are not required to meet separate
capital requirements, it is much easier for a foreign bank desiring to
conduct operations in Great Britain to establish a banking branch
than a subsidiary. 20 The Second Directive, however, substantially
impacts the decision of whether to operate as a branch or a subsidiary
after 1992.211
In West Germany, all foreign banks operating branches or subsid-
iary banks must be licensed by the Federal Supervisory Authority.5 2
Foreign parent banks operating in West Germany must supply branches
or subsidiaries with an appropriate amount of initial capital.23 Al-
though it is not difficult for foreign banks to begin operations, once
established, they face the same strict supervision and limitations on
their banking operations as do domestic banks.254
C. Anticipated Changes Due to the Second Directive
While banking regulations in Great Britain favor establishing
branches, the Second Directive requires that non-EEC based banks
establish a subsidiary before access is allowed throughout the entire
EEC.255 Banks currently operating as branches in Great Britain must
once a foreign bank gains a banking license they are subject to the same regulatory requirements
as are domestic banks. However, before being granted a license, a foreign bank must supply
detailed information concerning its home country's regulatory system. See id., (pt. 2), at 187.
In Belgium, the CB has shown an exceptional willingness to cooperate with the supervisory
agencies in other countries by providing information received by the CB concerning branches
or subsidiaries of foreign banks to their home countries. Id. at 177.
247. DALE, supra note 193, at 58.
248. Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 1), supra note 17, at 1096.
249. Id. See also DALE, supra note 193, at 58. (the Netherlands requires foreign banks to
provide information about ability of parent organization to supervise operations).
250. DALE, supra note 193, at 58; see also Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 1), supra
note 17, at 1096 (branches not required to maintain separate capital). By contrast, the
Netherlands requires branches of foreign banks to maintain separate branch accounts, listing
the amount of initial capital contributed by their parent organizations. DALE, supra note 193,
at 48; see also Friesen, International Lending, (pt. 2), supra note 17, at 187 (branches of
foreign banks maintain separate capital).
251. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
252. PELT ZER & BROOKS, supra note 219, § 32(1) at 62.
253. DALE, supra note 193, at 30. This is a marked difference from the licensing of branches
in Great Britain where capital from the parent is examined in determining whether to grant a
license to a branch. Id.
254. PELTZER & BROOKS, supra note 219, § 52 at 75.
255. See supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
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incur the expense of forming a subsidiary under the Second Directive 6
or face the prospect of losing clients to banks which have established
a subsidiary in Great Britain and have opened offices near their
clients on the continent. 25
7
London can expect that its preeminent position in the Eurodollar
market will be challenged by other EEC financial centers. As the
differences in the regulatory requirements of Member States disap-
pear, banks will have less reason to form subsidiaries in London
rather than in other EEC financial centers. Even before regulatory
distinctions disappear, bank subsidiaries located in London will open
offices in other financial centers while benefiting from the compar-
atively lax regulatory requirements in Great Britain. These new offices
will attract local business to the new financial center, and away from
London.
Because of its rigid regulatory system, West Germany will see an
influx of banks established as subsidiaries in other Member States as
a result of the Second Directive. These new banks will be organized
under the less restrictive laws of the home Member State and will be
able to conduct the activities allowed by the home Member State and
the Annex25s at a lower cost than West German banks. The West
German banking authorities will have to respond to this increased
competition by non-West German banks. The regulatory requirements
for West German banks will have to be lowered in order for domestic
banks to successfully compete with the non-West German banks.
This lowering of regulatory requirements will provide a classic ex-
ample of the race for the bottomY 9
The Eurodollar market in West Germany should grow in size as
banks will be able to service the Eurodollar needs of West German
clients closer to home. For example, a West German client will be
able to contact the local office of its British bank in West Germany,
instead of in London. Initially, non-West German banks should
dominate the growing Eurodollar market in West Germany because
256. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text describing the minimum requirements
for establishing a subsidiary.
257. An example would be a West German Firm currently depositing the dollars it receives
from dollar denominated transactions in Bank A located in London where it earns a higher
rate of interest than in West Germany. Such a firm may also have Eurodollar borrowing needs
when purchasing goods in dollars. If Bank B, also located in London but organized as a
subsidiary, opens an office in Frankfurt, the West German firm will desire to deposit its
dollars in Frankfurt for administrative convenience and cost savings in communicating with
Bank B.
258. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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of their lower cost structure. However, as West German regulatory
restrictions are removed, West German banks will begin to compete
successfully with non West German banks and to gain an increased
share of the market.
Competition in the Eurodollar market will increase as a result of
the Second Directive. EEC based banks located in one Member State
will open offices closer to their clients in other Member States to
provide Eurodollar services. The volume of Eurodollar activity in
the current financial centers such as London and Luxembourg should
decline as offices are established in countries such as West Ger-
many.2 ° Over time, domestic banks in countries with strict regulatory
requirements will become more competitive as market pressures force
their governments to adopt less restrictive bank regulations. Banking
integration will produce changes in the Eurodollar market for de-
positors, borrowers, and lenders alike.
V. THE IMPACT OF BANKING INTEGRATION ON THE EURODOLLAR
MARKET
A. Impact on Depositors and Borrowers
By creating a single market, the EEC will stimulate growth in
industries other than banking. 26' As economic growth occurs, inter-
national trade between the EEC and the rest of the world will expand,
increasing the supply of dollars flowing into the EEC as well as the
demand for dollars by firms financing international purchases of
goods and services. 262 Multinational corporations will continue their
260. Luxembourg will continue to have the facilities and trained personnel to compete in
the Eurodollar market. But with the Second Directive opening access to other EEC Member
States, particularly West Germany, Luxembourg should experience a reduction in Eurodollar
deposits held and loans extended from banks operating in Luxembourg. Banks located in
Luxembourg, because of the liberal banking environment, will open offices closer to their
clients in other EEC countries. The volume of Eurodollar activity originating in Luxembourg
should decline as a result of the Second Directive.
261. The Economics of 1992, 35 EuR. EcoN. 107 (1988) [hereinafter Economics of 19921.
The article notes:
The completion of the internal market which will bring an expansion - sometimes
considerable - of the market in which enterprises do business, provides scope for
increasing the size of operations, and this can lead to considerable reductions in
costs. The term "economies of scale", used generally to describe the effects of size
on costs, covers a wide range of phenomena, from purely static economies of a
technical nature to dynamic phenomena linked to experience.
Id.
262. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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cash management practices by placing more dollars in investments
such as Eurocertificates of deposit. In addition to increased deposits
by existing Eurodollar market participants, the Second Directive will
permit banks to tap new sources of Eurodollar deposits in order to
fund the increased demand for Eurodollar loans. 26 13 Therefore, Eu-
robanks will see an increase in both the supply and demand for
Eurodollars.
1. Depositors: Untapped Sources of Eurodollars
Traditionally, medium and small firms have not participated in
the Eurodollar market due to their size or lack of financial sophis-
tication. These smaller firms will have the opportunity to become
"Euroinvestors.11 264 For example, a British bank may open a branch
in West Germany, accepting deposits in marks and other currencies
such as the dollar. West German companies currently depositing
dollars into local West German banks will have more banks com-
peting for their dollar deposit business. Thus, it will be more con-
venient for medium and small size firms to deposit dollars in a West
German branch office of a British bank than it would be to conduct
business in London.
Banking integration permits banks from different EEC Member
States with lower cost structures to compete directly with the local
bank for dollar deposits. The banks with lower cost structures can
offer higher interest rates on Eurocertificates of deposit, thereby
attracting deposits while continuing to earn income on the bank's
Eurodollar loans. 265 Medium and small firms will have the same
opportunity as multinational corporations to utilize the Eurodollar
market for cash management purposes. As the interest rates on
Eurodollar deposits climb, the margins on Eurodollar loans should
decline.
2. Borrowers
If, as anticipated, economic growth occurs in the EEC, multina-
tional corporations will have a greater demand for Eurodollars in
263. For the Euromarket, the most important of the activities allowed under the Annex
are deposit-taking and other forms of borrowing, lending, and trading for ones own account
or for the customer in money market instruments (e.g., cheques, CDs). See supra note 26
(text of Annex to Second Directive).
264. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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order to finance international trade transactions. Additionally, me-
dium and small firms which had not participated in international
trade will have new opportunities to purchase goods and services
from abroad. These firms, experiencing growth in their foreign trade,
will require Eurodollar loans for the first time.
266
Interest rates on loans are less in the Eurodollar market than in
the U.S. domestic market. 267 This interest rate differential, which
should increase after the Second Directive is implemented, should
result in increased Eurodollar borrowing. American corporate bor-
rowers seeking to issue Eurobonds are finding that the European
market is concerned over the borrower's credit quality and the
prospects for corporate takeovers. 268 Instead of issuing bonds, large
corporations are borrowing on the Eurodollar loan market. 269 More-
over, medium size U.S. firms, continuing the trend of the past five
years, will increasingly borrow Eurodollars. 270
Finally, sovereign borrowers, who once formed the backbone of
the Eurodollar loan market, may find the reduced interest rates
attractive and re-enter the market. Before the debt crisis of 1982,27,
sovereign borrowing was the principle source of lending activity in
the Euromarket. 272 In recent years, sovereign borrowers representing
good credit risks have raised dollars by other means. 273 Today,
sovereign borrowing makes up only four percent of the market.
274
266. Banks will charge the new high risk borrowers higher interest rates than less risky
multinational corporations because they are either new to the market, or not as strong
financially so there is a greater risk of the debt going bad. See also infra notes 279-82 and
accompanying text (discussing banks going "down-market").
267. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (LIBOR considerably lower than U.S.
prime rate).
268. See Kochan, Lenders Step Into The Breach, EuRoMoNEY, Dec. 1989, supp. at 23
[hereinafter Kochan]. "[Takeovers] have made the equity holders rich and left the bond holders
on the sidelines." Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 24. Bank of America has specialized in bringing medium-sized U.S.
corporations to the loan market over the last five years. Id.
271. The debt crisis began in 1982 when Mexico announced it was unable to continue
making payments on its international debt. See Bagdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United
States Reconsiders, 64 FoR. Ass. 259, 262 (1985-86) (excellent overview of events in mid-1970s
leading to debt crisis and of United States response to crisis through 1985); Cline, Mexico's
Crisis, The World's Peril, 49 FOR. PoL'Y 107 (1982-83) (describing how debt crisis began in
Mexico, but has worldwide ramifications for all debtor and creditor nations).
272. Kochan, supra note 268, at 106; see also Moreno, supra note 153 (since 1982 debt
crisis international investors prefer holding direct credit over Eurodollar deposits).
273. Keller, Lend The Money, Then Sell the Debt, EtrRoMoNEY, Aug. 1989, at 106
[hereinafter Keller] (Eurobonds and Euronotes have been the preferred financing device); see
also Moreno, supra note 153.
274. Keller, supra note 273, at 106.
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However, with the Eurodollar loan rates expected to decrease, sov-
ereign borrowers may re-enter the loan market taking advantage of
the flexibility of Eurodollar loans.
B. The Market Risk for Banks
The effects of the Second Directive will result in "the possible
reduction in costs of intermediation by banks .... -27 The Euro-
dollar market is already extremely competitive, and the Second
Directive will force banks to adapt to an even more competitive
environment. Banks wishing to continue operating in the Eurodollar
market may have to accept what would otherwise be unacceptable
risks to remain profitable.
Currently, banks are finding it difficult to operate profitably in
the Eurodollar market because "interest margins and fees languish
at rock bottom levels. ' 276 But banks struggling to retain valued
relationships with clients will get the deal done at any price.2 77
Sometimes a bank will sacrifice earning a profit on a specific Eu-
rodollar loan if the borrower's overall relationship with the bank is
profitable. As banks begin operating on an EEC-wide basis they
should centralize their administrative operations in order to fund
loans at a lower cost.278 Only these banks will be able to lend to the
strongest borrowers at the upper end of the market.
All banks in the Eurodollar market, especially those that are not
able to cut costs,279 will compensate for the thin margins at the upper
end of the market by moving down-market and lending to the higher
risk borrowers.38 After the higher risk borrowers enter the market,
Eurodollar loan rates should rise, but remain less than the market
interest rate before banking integration. 1 Additionally, lending at a
275. Economics of 1992, supra note 261, at 88.
276. Keller, supra note 273, at 99.
277. Id. at 100.
278. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
280. The Eurodollar loan market will be two-tiered. Borrowers at the upper end of the
market, will continue to receive Eurodollar loans which are unprofitable to the banks, but
necessary for relationship purposes. Borrowers at the lower end of the market must pay a
higher interest rate because they represent greater credit risks to the bank.
281. The average interest rate for all borrowers in the Eurodollar market will indicate a
reduction in the interest rate after banking integration. This can be shown graphically as
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higher interest rate to riskier borrowers and earning higher income
in effect subsidizes the banks' Eurodollar loans to the best borrowers.
If banks manage their loan portfolios prudently, moving down-
market should not be a problem; however, in moving down-market
in search of profits, banks may start to overlook potential credit
follows:
q1 q2 q3
S1 equals the supply of Eurodollar deposits, and Dl equals the demand for Eurodollar loans.
Let pl represent the current price for a Eurodollar loan and ql equal the quantity of Eurodollar
borrowers.
The supply of Eurodollar deposits will increase because of more dollars flowing into the
EEC and since previously untapped holders of dollars are beginning to deposit their dollars
into banks more willing to utilize the deposit. The result is a shift in the supply curve from
S1 to S2 and there is movement along the demand curve Dl. The demand curve has remained
constant, but because there are excess dollars, banks are actively lending the Eurodollars that
they did not have before the supply of Eurodollars increased. The result is a decrease in the
interest rate of a Eurodollar loan from pl to p2.
Banks will compensate for this by locating borrowers who previously did not have a need
or who were not actively engaged in the Eurodollar market. As new borrowers are added, the
demand curve shifts from DI to D2. The result is that the interest rate on a Eurodollar loan
rises from p2 to p3.
This graph was designed without consideration for the cross-elasticity of demand for other
currencies such as the mark or the pound. The interest rates of various currencies in relation
to each other influence the supply and demand for those currencies. The "cross-elasticity of
demand" is defined as "The responsiveness of quantity demanded of one good to a change
in the price of another." EcONomcs DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 91.
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risks. Banks must be careful that competition in the marketplace




The EEC's attempt to forge a single market of the Member States
is ambitious when considering the historical, institutional, and legal
diversity in the community. If the single market is to succeed, it is
vital that the EEC achieve banking integration. The Second Directive,
built on the mutual recognition of banking licenses and home Member
State supervision, will improve the competitiveness of EEC banks,
and lower banking costs throughout the EEC. In time, as Member
States race for the bottom, the regulatory and supervisory differences
are expected to disappear. Although London should continue as the
EEC's financial center, as banks begin operating on an EEC-wide basis,
other financial centers on the continent should grow appreciably.
EEC banking integration will significantly impact the Eurodollar
market. Just as restrictive U.S. regulatory policies helped create the
Eurodollar market, the EEC's banking integration will promote mar-
ket competition as well as growth. Lawyers discussing these changes
with American or European depositors and borrowers must be aware
of the impact of banking integration in the EEC on their clients who
interact in the Eurodollar market.
Depositors and borrowers operating in the Eurodollar market will
find the market more competitive after the Second Directive comes
282. Large Eurodollar loans are made through loan syndications, in which several banks
agree to fund a portion of the loan and assume part of the risk of the borrower defaulting
on the credit. By spreading the risk among several banks, there is less chance that any one
bank will absorb a large loss due to a borrower defaulting on a loan. See generally SHM'mo,
supra note 61, at 775 (discussing syndicated loans and country risk). The bank that negotiates
the loan with the borrower and manages the relationship after the loan is funded is called the
lead bank or syndicated loan manager. A lead bank usually earns an additional fee for
arranging the loan.
The ten largest lead banks in 1988 are:
($ millions)
1) Citicorp $47,424.40
2) J.P. Morgan $43,655.90
3) Bankers Trust Company $28,819.10
4) Manufacturers Hanover $26,379.10
5) Chase Investment Bank $25,679.20
6) Chemical Bank $17,842.10
7) Barclays de Zoete Wedd $15,460.00
8) Midland Montagu $15,413.10
9) National Westminster $13,241.00
10) CSFB $11,156.60
Brady, Assets Must Earn their Keep, EuaoMoNEY, Mar. 1989, supp. at 35.
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into force. The Eurodollar market's size should increase, with de-
positors and borrowers experiencing unprecedented investment and
borrowing opportunities. Initially, the interest rates on Eurodollar
loans should decline due to a surplus in dollar deposits, but banks
will compensate by accepting greater risk on their loans. Medium
and small firms that previously did not require Eurodollar loan
financing, or borrowers who previously would not have qualified for
Eurodollar loans, will provide the banks with the income they need
to stay in the Eurodollar market.
The Second Directive will apply only to newcomers, because the
EEC does not intend to apply it retroactively. Therefore, lawyers
advising non EEC banks planning to begin operating in the EEC
should advise clients to form or purchase a subsidiary in an EEC
Member State before the Second Directive takes effect. Entry into
the EEC should be accomplished as quickly as possible to avoid the
potential of additional costs and the reciprocity requirement of the
Second Directive. The client should seek to establish a subsidiary in
the country with the least restrictive regulatory supervision and then
expand into the remainder of the EEC after January 1, 1993.
Non EEC based banks currently operating as branches in the EEC
must decide whether to spend the capital necessary to form or
purchase a subsidiary. If non EEC banks currently operating as
branches choose not to form a subsidiary, they will not be able to
participate in EEC-wide banking. Most American banks face this
decision because the vast majority currently operate as branches
rather than subsidiaries. All banks must contend with increasing
competition and ever thinner profit margins.
Robert Lantz
